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INTRODUCTION
U.S. Antitrust Laws and the Global
Market: National and
Extraterritorial Enforcement
Introduction by Professor Christian Johnson
My name is Christian Johnson. I am a new
professor here at Loyola University Chicago. It
is my pleasure to introduce the panel for the last
discussion of this afternoon. For those of you who
were here this morning, you know that this
morning's discussion was about the proper goals
of antitrust. The second panel discussed the de-
tection and punishment of tacit collusion. Both
panels touched on and in that way provide a nice
introduction to this panel's topic, the enforcement
of the United State's antitrust laws in the inter-
national context.
I think this panel's topic encompasses both
previous panel's discussions and is the most
timely considering the increasing move toward
globalization in this economy. First, I doubt
whether any of our previous panelists would dis-
pute the proposition that international enforce-
ment of U.S. antitrust laws is a proper goal of
antitrust. It may not be an attainable goal, but it
is certainly a proper goal. From the second
panel's discussion, it is clear that a major issue
concerning the domestic enforcement of the an-
titrust laws comes from the fact that collusive
agreements often originate in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. Ms. Moltenbrey told us how gathering evi-
dence concerning a collusive agreement, while
difficult in the United States, is made much more
difficult when the meetings take place and the
agreement is made in a foreign jurisdiction.
The first panelist to speak will be Professor
Harry First. He is professor of law at New York
University School of Law where he teaches an-
titrust and regulated industries. Professor First
has visited Japan twice as a Fulbright Research
Fellow. Before beginning his teaching career he
was an attorney with the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Antitrust Division. He is a gradu-
ate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
and has published extensively in the area of an-
titrust. Today, he will be presenting his ideas with
respect to the prospects for international antitrust
enforcement.
The Honorable Diane Wood, Circuit Judge for
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, will
also be participating in the panel discussion.
Judge Wood was appointed to the Seventh Cir-
cuit in 1995. Prior to being appointed to sit on
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Wood was Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Di-
vision of the U.S. Department of Justice. She is
a graduate of the University of Texas Law School
170 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter Volume 9, number 2
and clerked for Supreme Court Justice
Blackmun. Judge Wood has taught at the Uni-
versity of Chicago School of Law and has a spe-
cial expertise in antitrust law and federal civil
procedure.
Finally, Stephen Rasher is Assistant General
Counsel for United Airlines where he has the
responsibility for all international legal matters,
including those touching on antitrust. He has had
extensive experience with various acquisitions
and commercial transactions which involved
United Airlines. Before joining United Mr.
Rasher worked for Mayer, Brown & Platt and
Katten, Muchin & Zavis in Chicago. He is a
graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School.
I think that Mr. Gotfryd should be commended
for putting together such a qualified and distin-
guished panel. It is with great pleasure that I
present our first speaker, Professor First.
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Presentation by Professor First:
Now as the "closer" for today's proceedings,
I think I should say what we learned from the
prior panelists. Ralph Nader has left, but one
thing that struck me is that he believes that crimi-
nal capitalism is not a redundant term because
he talked about criminal capitalism in Eastern
Europe; this gives me hope that some capitalism
is not criminal. Richard Epstein told us (shock-
ingly) that antitrust will not cure everything. It
will not redistribute wealth, and it won't give us
necessarily the glorious society, but he did say
that the core of antitrust, which he approves of,
is the rule against horizontal price fixing. Finally,
a commentator who is really the segue to our
panel is Eleanor Fox, who reminds us of the
importance of market access and who said some
important things about international enforcement
and enforcement in Europe.
In my remarks, I would
like to talk about three
things: First, I want to begin
by taking stock of some of
the past efforts at interna-
tional antitrust enforcement
and, specifically, U.S. inter-
national antitrust enforce-
ment. Second, I will say a
little bit about some of what
I think are the core difficul-
ties of international antitrust
enforcement. Third, I will of-
fer a few suggestions about
the future prospects for in-
ternational antitrust enforce-
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ment.
With all of the emphasis and discussion about
international trade and internationalism and how
the world is changing, we might tend to think
that this is a new problem for antitrust enforce-
ment, but, in fact, of course, it is not. There has
been a long concern about international trade and
it goes back to the passage of the Sherman Act
in 1890--concern about imports coming into the
United States and their importance in our
economy.
One of the earliest antitrust prosecutions by
the Justice Department was an effort to break up
the international cigarette cartel which had di-
vided world cigarette markets (United States v.
American Tobacco, 328 U.S. 781). We also have
long had a concern about export trade and the
effect of antitrust rules on exports. In 1918, Con-
Harry First is a Professor ofLaw at the New York University School
of Law and the Director of the law school's Trade Regulation Pro-
gram. Professor First's teaching interests include antitrust, inter-
national and comparative antitrust, and innovation policy. He is
the co-author of law school casebooks on antitrust and regulated
industries, as well as the author of a casebook on business crime.
He is also the author of numerous articles involving antitrust law,
with a recent emphasis on international trade and competition
issues. Professor First has twice been a Fulbright Research Fel-
low in Japan and has served as an Adjunct Professor of Law at
the University of Tokyo. Prior to entering law teaching, Professor
First was an attorney with the United States Department of Jus-
tice, Antitrust Division. Professor First is also currently Of Coun-
sel to Loeb & Loeb in New York City. Professor First earned his
B.A. and J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.
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gress enacted the Webb-Pomerene Act in an ef-
fort to give U.S. exporting firms a safe harbor
where they would not be subject to U.S. anti-
trust law liability for certain behavior abroad.
Still, as we look back over the history of anti-
trust enforcement, there are two periods in which
international antitrust enforcement was quite
prominent. The first period is 1939 to 1942, the
period when Thurman Arnold was heading the
antitrust division.
Thurman Arnold's interest in international
antitrust enforcement stemmed from his interest
in the anticompetitive uses of patents. As the
Antitrust Division began to look at the patent
cases, it found that: (1) patents governed a num-
ber of critical war industries; (2) patents were
used by a number of international cartels; and
(3) many of these cartels involved German firms.
These investigations led to quite a bit of enforce-
ment activity. I will give you a little list of the
industries involved in international cartel behav-
ior against which the Antitrust Division moved:
potash makers, military optical instruments, syn-
thetic rubber, electric lighting, electrical equip-
ment, aluminum, magnesite, magnesite brick,
tools and dies, photographic materials, nitrogen
products, magnesium products, acrylic products,
pharmaceutical and biological products, titanium
die stuffs and molybdenite concentrates. If you
add the cases up, approximately 30 cases involv-
ing international anti-competitive practices were
brought in this 1939 to 1943 period.
Note that when Thurman Arnold was engaged
in this effort, our nation had just come out of the
Depression, and we were heading towards the
Second World War and the central planning that
it entailed. There was some question about the
wisdom of antitrust in a war time context.
In effect, Arnold's prosecutions of these inter-
national cartels provided some persuasive justi-
fication for having antitrust laws. They showed
that trade restraints could affect important war
industries, and they showed how cartel arrange-
ments could be used to benefit German firms
while disadvantaging U.S. firms. In a statement
indicative of the rhetoric of that time, the Attor-
ney General, Francis Biddle, wrote in his annual
report in 1942: "Vigorous action has been taken
to break the control exercised by Nazi-dominated
international cartels over vital American inter-
ests."
Note, also, that Arnold's enforcement efforts
were probably consistent with the state of anti-
trust law at the time, although it is difficult to
tell for certain because so many were settled by
pleas or decrees. That is, as a matter of antitrust
doctrine, Arnold did not push to test the limits of
U.S. jurisdiction in these cases.
The second important period really starts in
1990, and continues through the present. In 1990,
the Justice Department began a new effort at in-
ternational antitrust enforcement by threatening
to remove a footnote from a policy statement.
Maybe this does not sound like a grand enforce-
ment effort, but the footnote was "Footnote 159"
in the Justice Department's 1988 guidelines for
international operations, which were issued dur-
ing the Reagan administration. In Footnote 159,
the government pointed out that it would bring
suit against restraints of trade affecting exports
only if these restraints adversely affected U.S.
consumers.
The enforcement position which the Reagan
administration took reflected antitrust philoso-
phy of that time, which stressed that the purpose
of antitrust is to advance consumer welfare, as
reflected by the achievement of allocative effi-
ciency, and not to advance producer welfare.
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Restraints on exports from the United States
might adversely affect U.S. producers reducing
their sales abroad, but the affect in and of itself
was irrelevant to antitrust. Footnote 159 meant
that U.S. antitrust enforcers should be concerned
only if an export restraint ended up affecting U.S.
consumers.
A change in Footnote 159 was first hinted at
in 1990 by Jim Rill, who headed the Antitrust
Division during the Bush administration. This
hint came in the context of our Strategic Impedi-
ments Initiative talks with Japan's government
in which the United States was complaining
about barriers to entry into Japan's markets.
In 1992, when the Clinton administration took
office, it pledged to further increase the pressure
on Japan and to become more confrontational.
Footnote 159 was already out, and the adminis-
tration wasted little time marrying antitrust to the
then current trade policy. This is similar to what
happened in Thurman Arnold's day, when anti-
trust enforcers appeared to be anxious to show
that antitrust was relevant to broader policy and,
again, to the broader foreign policy effort.
So what have been the results of this current
push for antitrust enforcement? We basically
have two categories of cases. There has been
some civil litigation and some criminal prosecu-
tions of price-fixing conspiracies involving U.S.
and non-U.S. firms.
On the civil side, three cases have been filed,
and all have been settled by consent decree. Per-
haps the most well-known of these cases, is
Pilkington, (PPG Industries, Inc., v. Pilkington
plc, 825 F.Supp. 1465 (1993)) which was filed
in 1993, four years after the threat to remove the
footnote.
Pilkington is the company that developed the
process for manufacturing flat glass and con-
trolled that process throughout the world through
its licensing efforts. The Justice Department, in
a consent decree, enjoined Pilkington from en-
forcing any agreement that would restrict the ter-
ritories within which its licensees could build flat
glass plants, thereby freeing U.S. builders and
U.S. glass companies to build plants abroad in
other countries, such as China. The Justice De-
partment claimed that the potential non-U.S. sales
freed up could range from $500 million to $2.5
billion, not a small amount.
The second and third civil cases are quite simi-
lar, not to Pilkington, but to each other. They in-
volve telephone companies. One is MCI's joint
venture with British Telecommunications, and
the other is a joint venture between Sprint,
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom. In both
cases, the U.S. telephone carrier entered into a
joint venture with a non-U.S. carrier or carriers
which would allow access by the joint venturers
to each other's network for the purposes of com-
pleting international calls and offering callers
"seamless service" for international calls. In both
cases, decrees were entered to ensure nondis-
criminatory access to the non-U.S. networks by
competing U.S. long distance carriers, AT&T,
MCI, or Sprint.
On the criminal side, prosecutions have been
pursued against agreements in six industries-
the most recent is the ADM lysine litigation
which we have already referred to. These have
been fairly successful prosecutions in the sense
that most of the parties pled guilty and paid fines.
There have been some problems with criminal
prosecutions, however. One example of this is
the GE prosecution, a criminal prosecution
against GE, DeBeers, and two non-U.S. citizens.
The Justice Department was only able to bring
General Electric before the criminal court.
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DeBeers and the two indicted individuals did not
appear. The result was a failure of the
government's proof at trial and a grant of Gen-
eral Electric's motion of acquittal by the district
court.
The other problem that the government has
run into arose in the thermal fax paper prosecu-
tions. The most recent of these cases was brought
against a company called Nippon Paper, a Japa-
nese corporation. It was charged with entering
into an agreement with other thermal fax com-
petitors in Japan to raise the price of exported
thermal fax paper.
Rather than pleading guilty, like everyone else
had in this prosecution, Nippon challenged the
assertion of United States jurisdiction over it. The
district court judge found that Nippon, in fact,
had sold fax paper for export to two trading com-
panies within Japan, which is the normal pro-
cess for exporting products in Japan, and that it
engaged in no activity in the United States. The
court held that a criminal prosecution for viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could not
be brought because "none of the overt acts of
the conspiracy took place within the United
States."
If we compare the record of the current Jus-
tice Department with the record during Thurman
Arnold's administration, the results of the cur-
rent administration are more mixed. For example,
the government withdrew Footnote 159 so that
it could reach export restraints, but there has not
been a case which only involved exports to test
the question of U.S. jurisdiction. EvenPilkington
involved imports as well as exports; as a result
of the decree, firms will be freer to import as
well as export. And, of course, there are a lot
fewer cases brought during this period than in
Thurman Arnold's day. The fact that Thurman
Arnold bought more successful cases, though,
is, in some ways, not particularly surprising be-
cause the enforcement targets of those days were
easier targets. The targets of prosecution then
were cartels that prevented imports into the
United States and prevented companies from
competing in the United States. This idea of con-
cern for import competition was well accepted
as an antitrust concern, and it was backed by the
fact that a lot of cartel participants were also
German corporations heavily involved in the
German war effort.
By contrast, the policies behind the current
push for international enforcement are deeply
controversial. There are substantial questions
about whether antitrust, for example, is appro-
priately used to address the issue of market ac-
cess. As the Nippon Paper (United States v.
Nippon Paper Industry Co., Ltd., 944 F Supp.
55 (D. Mass. 1996); but see, United States v.
Nippon Paper Industry Co., Ltd., No. 96-2001,
1997 WL 109100 (1st Cir. (Mass.)) case indi-
cates, there remains strong reaction to the use of
U.S. law to police conduct that takes place
abroad.
There are two other problems with interna-
tional antitrust enforcement. One involves anti-
trust theory-whether consumer welfare and
allocative efficiency are the right goals or achiev-
able goals for antitrust.
I would suggest that these goals become much
more difficult to achieve on an international level.
It is difficult enough to think about whether we
can support a policy of antitrust in specific cases
within the United States because we might make
our economy more efficient allocatively, but how
do we ask the question or even begin to ask the
question, on an international level? Can the ap-
plication of antitrust make the international world
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economy more allocatively efficient? It seems
like a difficult question, not to ask, but to an-
swer.
In terms of consumer welfare-two words that
are easy to say but sometimes harder to pin down
in meaning-the question when we think inter-
nationally is, whose consumer is it? After all, if
consumer welfare is our goal, why is it that we
should stop (as Footnote 159 of the 1988 guide-
lines did) with U.S. consumers? Why are we not
concerned with exports? Things that are exports
for us are, in fact, imports for other consumers,
non-U.S. consumers. If antitrust is concerned
about consumer welfare, can we ignore non-U.S.
consumers?
The other problem with antitrust theory is that
our emphasis on consumer welfare has led us
toward an analytical approach in antitrust that
has made it difficult to consider market access
in itself as a separate worthwhile goal of anti-
trust. I will just use Japan as an example.
When we think about the exclusion of U.S.
firms from markets in Japan, our first reaction
might be, from the U.S. exporter's point of view,
are there other markets available to U.S. export-
ers? Indeed, is Japan even a"market" in the an-
titrust sense as we have been using the term? And
perhaps there are already enough sellers within
"the market" in Japan such that it is competitive
even without the U.S. firm.
In fact, as a result of today's standard antitrust
analysis, we may not, under that kind of market-
definition approach, necessarily increase market
access. We may instead find that our current ana-
lytical approach brings us to the result that we
have no antitrust violation because that market
is already competitive.
In addition to antitrust theory, international
antitrust enforcement raises a question about the
institutions of antitrust enforcement, and here I
think the problem is pretty obvious and very dif-
ficult. There is no international antitrust enforce-
ment authority. We have international issues, and
I have talked about U.S. international antitrust
enforcement, but our only working model of en-
forcement is the nation-state's enforcement au-
thority.
If we return our inquiry to Thurman Arnold's
day, you might argue, in fact, that the United
States in those days actually served as an inter-
national antitrust enforcement agency. No other
country at that time had a strong antitrust law.
There was no European Union; no laws at that
time fostered competition in Japan or Germany.
In the post-war period, though, the assertion
of U.S. antitrust authority became very contro-
versial. In the 1970s, it provoked enactment by
our allies of retaliatory legislation-blocking and
claw-back legislation-and the reaction continues
today. Japan has vigorously condemned the era-
sure of Footnote 159 and condemned the U.S.
government for bringing the Pilkington case.
The attack on U.S. unilateralism, which has
occurred in recent years, has led to a ihalting U.S.
response to do something that does not seem quite
as unilateral and has given rise to some notion
of what has been called "positive comity"-ask-
ing non-U.S. enforcement authorities to investi-
gate antitrust issues, giving them the chance per-
haps to do something about antitrust problems
that occur within their territories before the
United States asserts jurisdiction over those dis-
putes.
Unfortunately, but no doubt predictably, not
every enforcement agency stands ready to inves-
tigate cases that the Justice Department would
like to see brought. One example of this is found
in the thermal fax paper case itself. In the wake
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of the dismissal of the indictment in the Nippon
Paper case, one might perhaps hope that Japan's
Fair Trade Commission might take a look at the
situation since virtually all of the companies that
have pleaded guilty in this case are, in fact, Japa-
nese companies, and, in fact, the Japanese do use
thermal fax paper, but there seems to be no in-
terest in Japan in such an investigation.
Another response that has occurred in com-
plaints about U.S. unilateralism is a slow, but
perhaps steady, movement to articulate some set
of substantive international antitrust principles,
along with some tentative suggestions for mak-
ing the World Trade Organization, the WTO, into
some sort of international antitrust body, perhaps
just to mediate disputes. Whatever problems
there are in articulating an agreed upon set of
substantive standards, and in some ways maybe
certain core principles are not that difficult to
articulate, the problems of establishing an inter-
national authority are even more daunting. Per-
haps the WTO may turn out to have some medi-
ating role, but it's hard to imagine a role that will
end up being much more than that, for example,
an investigative or prosecutorial role. We return
again to the Nippon Paper case. If the United
States cannot prosecute the parties, and Japan will
not, it is hard to believe that the WTO is now
going to step in and do something.
This brings me to the third part of my remarks:
What are the prospects for international antitrust
enforcement? What is important for international
antitrust enforcement is to re-examine our goals
of antitrust. This reexamination is important, not
only because of the difficulty of using allocative
efficiency as a way of measuring whether anti-
trust policy is right, but also because the popu-
larity of antitrust on an international level calls
for some explanation that does not reside in the
Chicago School's theories. If we think about the
popularity of antitrust on an international level,
and we want to associate antitrust with one word,
I suggest the word is not "efficiency." The word
is "freedom."
If we look at what happened in the late 1980s,
as antitrust's popularity spread, and not just in
Eastern Europe, but in Asia as well, countries
were moving away from centralized government
control to free markets, with the emphasis on
"free." Countries were removing barriers, legal
and physical-barriers that impeded the entry of
goods and people, and I do not think that that
was just because they wanted markets to be
allocatively efficient and not have the welfare
loss triangle that economists like to talk about.
If we go back to U.S. antitrust law, the belief
in the importance of free entry into markets ac-
tually has a long history in U.S. antitrust law,
perhaps reaching its zenith with Justice Black's
opinions in the late 1950s. Recently, courts have
started to downplay or downgrade this idea, call-
ing the concern for competitor exclusion the 'no-
sparrow-shall-fall' view of antitrust as opposed
to the more vigorous and hard-edge view that
we protect competition, not competitors.
Even so, even with the retreat from a straight
concern for market access, the issue of access is
still very much alive in litigated cases, Eastman
Kodak v. Image Technical Services, (Eastman
Kodak v. Image Technical Service, Inc., 504 U.S.
451 (1992)) for example, and in U.S. antitrust
enforcement policy. I would add that as we look
on the international level, this goal is quite con-
sistent with the international economic policy that
we have pursued in the post-war era under the
GATT where the object has been to remove bar-
riers to trade.
In a sense, market access is consistent not only
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with traditional antitrust views and with politi-
cal values of freedom; it is also consistent with
the economic theories that underlay a liberal
world trading order. In terms of the institutions
of antitrust, given the problems of nation-state
enforcement, I think there is some sort of natu-
ral attraction to looking to the WTO and seeing
whether we can craft some international system.
At this point, though, the efforts are misplaced; I
would prefer that we return our attention to the
United States and enforcement in the courts in
the United States.
I have cataloged some of the problems that
we have had with enforcement in the United
States courts, but we should balance that against
some of the real strengths. First, antitrust in the
United States is at heart a legal system based on
rules that are ultimately articulated by the courts
and have to be rationally presented and justified.
As much as we know that there is politics in U.S.
antitrust, political deals in the end are not sup-
posed to be the way antitrust decisions are made.
This legal quality gives antitrust rules strong le-
gitimacy.
Second, as a general matter, antitrust courts in
the United States are not nationalistic and they
are not protectionist. They do not generally ap-
ply the law to favor U.S. citizens or to protect
U.S. citizens or firms from competition. The
Supreme Court's decision in Zenith v.
Matsushita, (Matsushita Electrical Industrial
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986)) where the Court treated skeptically
Zenith's claim of predatory behavior by the
Japanese television industry, well-illustrates the
non-nationalistic approach taken by U.S. courts.
Third, judicial systems in the United States are
highly developed and competent. We have in-
vested, if you think about it, substantial resources
in our courts and have paid particular attention
to the mechanisms of fact-finding, something that
is quite critical for resolving antitrust disputes.
Within this overall system, our antitrust infra-
structure is actually very strong. Lawyers are
well-trained in antitrust; economists are readily
available. We have a good infrastructure for
making antitrust decisions.
Fourth, we have not given government en-
forcement agencies a monopoly on antitrust en-
forcement. Perhaps one of the most critical in-
stitutional differences between U.S. antitrust and
antitrust in other countries is the existence of a
strong private cause of action and a strong pri-
vate antitrust bar in the United States. The gov-
ernment may have lost the General Electric crimi-
nal case, but there is private litigation still pend-
ing against General Electric for price-fixing of
industrial diamonds. The government may have
fostered an international cartel in aluminum, but
private litigants at least tried, although they
failed, to attack it. And even when we think about
the thermal fax paper case, private litigants could
still bring this case in the U.S. courts for dam-
ages.
Looking at the strengths of antitrust enforce-
ment in the U.S. courts, I would like to suggest
that in this area the United States actually has a
comparative advantage in producing antitrust
enforcement. In fact, if one applies to antitrust
enforcement the same approach that we applied
to the manufacture of automobiles or semicon-
ductors, it would be clear that we would be bet-
ter off if the United States were allowed to spe-
cialize in producing this product, leaving other
countries to make the products for which they
have competitive or comparative advantage.
Of course, we have not yet taken this approach
to the production of legal goods, and, actually,
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we do not always take this approach to the pro-
duction of other goods when it comes to national
interests. The core notion of comparative advan-
tage, though, is that it is wise to specialize in the
things that you do well. I would keep in mind
that we do antitrust well, and I would be con-
cerned about moving away from our somewhat
unilateral approach to suggest a multilateral ap-
proach to antitrust enforcement.
So, the bottom line: We should keep our an-
titrust goals truly international. We should be
concerned about market access and the right of
entrepreneurs to enter markets. We should seek
to advance consumer interests, not just in the
United States, but consumer interests generally.
Lastly, we should always keep in mind Thurman
Arnold's example of vigorous antitrust enforce-
ment involving international issues litigated in
U.S. courts. Thanks.
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Presentation by Judge Wood:
Preface
Free international trade is not an option; it is a
necessity. Antitrust has a role to play in assuring
international free trade, but its effects are long-
term. Litigants in antitrust actions often run into
problems when parties, witnesses, or documents
are located out of the United States. Though these
persons and documents may be obtained through
the sanctioning power of the U.S. court, the vic-
torious litigant may regret arousing the ire of the
other country if she needs to enforce her judg-
ment in that country. A better path may be for
the United States to form cooperative relation-
ships with these other countries. These relation-
ships and the resultant communications would
go a long way towards reconciling the goals of
our antitrust laws with those of other countries
and may help reassure other countries that the
information would not be divulged to inappro-
priate parties.
Presentation
Thank you all for being here. I appreciate this
opportunity to participate in the conference on
Antitrust Law for the New Millennium. We are
not talking decades here. We are not talking cen-
turies. We are going for the millennium, but af-
ter this morning, I now think that this was prob-
ably a correctly named conference.
is growing political sentiment for their further
reduction. That is a questionable proposition. I
have heard others, better placed than I, who won-
dered whether there is the political will, either in
the United States, or in Europe, or elsewhere in
the world, to push forward with more liberaliza-
tion than that which we achieved at the end of
I would like to comment on
what Harry [Professor First]
has said, but I would like to
begin with a few more general
remarks. I found the brochure
for this program, which I have
now studied very carefully,
very interesting in its descrip-
tion of what this session was
to be about. It notes, for ex-
ample, that international trade
barriers have fallen-true
enough. It postulates that there
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the Uruguay Round and with the creation of the
WTO.
The brochure also asks whether, under the
present state of transnational and international
antitrust enforcement, we can reach conduct that
is traditionally condemned in the United States
when it is now occurring all over the world. That
is this weird field that we have called interna-
tional antitrust.
I cannot begin to tell you how many people
have no idea that antitrust even has an interna-
tional dimension. But this will change, if it has
not started to change already. For this group,
however, the point is clear. And according to
Harry [Professor First], we have earned about a
C plus, if I might assign a grade in our ability
effectively to implement this policy right now.
And, finally, the brochure concludes with two
additional questions. One, do the benefits of free
international trade currently outweigh the risks
and, two, how do we keep trade free?
Well, none of us has the time this afternoon to
look at those two questions in their entirety, but
I do want to comment a bit on them, particularly
after Ralph Nader has told us what a bad idea
the GATT was. That is a sentiment that I do not
share, but it is worth a brief word.
'With respect to the question about the ben-
efits of free international trade, my real response
is almost a flippant one: Who are we kidding?
Do we really think we have a choice in today's
world between participating in the international
trading system, as it is, and not participating in
that system? That cannot possibly pass the
straight-face test. Unless the United States wants
to become the 21st Century equivalent of pre-
Admiral Perry Japan or post-World War II Alba-
nia, I think we are in this system for good whether
we want to be or not. More than that, I think we
want to be in it. We have certainly obtained many,
many benefits in terms of choice of products,
quality of products, export markets, and the like,
that people would be loathe to live without. In
fact, when you see the occasional trade fight es-
calate to the point where trade sanctions begin
to be traded back and forth, such as the pasta
wars, wine wars, computer panel wars, mush-
room wars, and the like, people begin to regret
that foreign products are coming in at a higher
price.
This underscores an important point: we may
be the only super power militarily, but we are
certainly not the only significant power economi-
cally. There are at least two other huge economic
forces in the persons of the European Union and
the Asian giants. Soon there may be a third, when
China begins to reach its full potential. The fact
of the matter is if we decide that we are going to
insist on playing only by our own rules, this will
come back to haunt us.
So I think in terms of that first question, we
are in this, and, yes, trade does help us. If we
decided to pull out, we would regret it.
The second question, "How do we keep trade
free?" is plainly important. We are trying today
to see the extent to which antitrust plays a role in
keeping free trade free. There are political and
legal dimensions to take into account as we try
to achieve this goal and as we try to preserve an
international trading system that is open, dy-
namic, and competitive.
I'm not asserting that we live in Utopia today.
We obviously do not. We do, however, have a
remarkable degree of openness, of market access,
and of global integration when you consider the
incredible political barriers that had to be over-
come to get to where we are.
Thus, the international trading system, as a
whole, parallels some of the points Harry [Pro-
fessor First] has been making. There is a politi-
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cal dimension to our commitment to international
free trade, and the legal institutions that we have
to support that system need to be clear and strong.
One of the achievements of the Uruguay Round
was that these institutions have become some-
what stronger as part of the WTO, although I
think no one would say that we are finished with
the process of developing those institutions.
Ralph Nader pointed out some areas of these in-
stitutions that need improvement; they are not
open as many would like, and the people who
staff the dispute resolution panels are not the kind
of independent judges that we find in national
courts. These are plainly areas in which further
work is necessary. The system as a whole, how-
ever, holds great promise for future trade liber-
alization and the concomitant prosperity it will
bring.
Now, let me turn to where antitrust fits into
this picture more directly. Does it really make
any difference whether there are antitrust laws
in every country in the world, or in some but not
others, whether the laws are enforced with equal
vigor, or whether only a few countries make an-
titrust the centerpiece of their economic policy?
Properly understood, I believe the answer is
"yes."
Antitrust has a positive role to play in the trad-
ing system, but its benefits are likely to be longer
term, as it helps to assure open, free, competi-
tive international markets. Antitrust is not likely
to be a kind of quick fix to a trade problem. It
must, therefore, be contrasted with laws like the
Anti-Dumping laws or the countervailing duties
laws or Section 301, which can respond rapidly
to certain unfair trade practices. With Section
301, once you convince the authorities that a
problem exists, boom, tariffs are imposed, nego-
tiations ensue, and (usually) the problem is re-
solved. On the whole, it is a pretty fast process.
Antitrust is something which attacks problems
in the market at their source, and so, only over
time, will you begin to see the benefits from well-
taken antitrust enforcement measures.
How does the political dimension of antitrust
enter this picture? There plainly is such a dimen-
sion, as Professor First has already suggested.
Our other speakers today have reinforced this
idea; certainly, one could not think otherwise af-
ter listening first to Ralph Nader and then to Ri-
chard Epstein. They obviously had different vi-
sions, and of course, neither antitrust nor eco-
nomics is a science. It is not going out there, tak-
ing the temperature, and seeing whether it is 33
degrees or whether it is 65 degrees.
There are now approximately 60 antitrust laws
around the world. They are all different. Some
of them stress one goal; some of them stress other
goals. If you look at the Canadian antitrust laws,
they have a laundry list of goals in Section 2,
which encompass virtually everything anyone
ever thought of that an antitrust law might do.
Allocative efficiency, equitable distribution of
wealth, control of large concentrations of power,
assistance to small-and medium-size businesses,
and market access, are among the goals that ap-
pear in these laws. Each country has chosen the
goals that are appropriate to it. We know, for
example, in the European Union that one of the
goals was to facilitate market integration. In the
United States, by contrast, the Commerce Clause
had been enforced for a hundred years by the
time we came up with the Sherman Act. We did
not really need to create a single national market
using the vehicle of antitrust laws.
Now in what sense does this mean that anti-
trust laws are political? There are two different
ways we could be using that term. One refers to
the legislative goals a particular country chooses
to have for its law. It will decide what goals it
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wishes to achieve, and, of course, some coun-
tries will have one set of goals and others will
have another. However, once the law is in place,
its content becomes fixed. Another possibile way
of using the term "political" is much more par-
ticularized, as when we speak of the political
dimensions that are brought to bear in the deci-
sion-making. The best illustration of the way that
can happen comes from the German merger law.
In Germany, once the Federal Cartel Office has
evaluated a merger and decided whether it is
appropriate from a competitive policy standpoint
from criteria in their own competition law, it
might decide that the merger would be an anti-
competitive one. You would think it then be-
comes forbidden. No. The Minister of the
Economy has a political override. He may con-
clude that even if it would be an anti-competi-
tive merger, it should be permitted for purely
political reasons: job preservation, regional de-
velopment, or anything else he deems important.
We do not have this particularized level of po-
litical enforcement in the United States. Further-
more, if you are going to have that kind of sys-
tem, as the Germans do, it is desirable to make
sure that the political component of it is a very
transparent one. The British have a similar sys-
tem in that they ultimately have the Minister for
State and Industry pass on their mergers and
monopolies to see if they're "in the public inter-
est," which is as vague a standard as it appears
to be.
Where does the United States stand? In my
view, the allocative efficiency goal that is para-
mount in antitrust has helped to keep the U.S.
antitrust laws apolitical. Courts have had the ben-
efit applying a weighted list of goals. We know
which goals will trump in the end. We know
which other goals of the law may be an addi-
tional or complementary benefit from enforce-
ment, but which are not something that would
override an efficiency-based argument. Robert
Bork made a case for this approach in The Anti-
trust Paradox where he invoked the metaphor
of the black box. If you have five different goals
and you just throw them into a black box and
stick your hand in and pull out the results, you
cannot know in a predictable way what the re-
sult will be. This makes it difficult for businesses
to plan, and it tempts the courts into behaving
more politically, in the second sense I am using
the term, than they should. Bork also stresses one
of the points that Richard Epstein made this
morning, which is that the efficiency goal does
not imply hostility to other worthy social goals.
It just means that other laws must take care of
other concerns, such as assistance to small-and-
medium-size businesses. One might help them
by forbidding lots of mergers, or by breaking up
exclusive distribution arrangements, or by tak-
ing other measures under the antitrust laws, but
if you really want to help small-to-medium sized
businesses, maybe you should adjust the tax code,
give the Small Business Administration more
money, or help out state and local government
programs. There are, in short, other ways to fos-
ter that kind of market structure if society deems
this to be important.
The scope of antitrust in the United States and
its efficiency basis may help to explain Profes-
sor First's observation that the U.S. courts are
the best place in the entire world to bring an an-
titrust case. Assuming this is true (and I would
like to believe it is), what explains it? First of
all, antitrust disputes are judged on "legal
grounds." That is an apolitical, predictable stan-
dard. Second, litigants in U.S. courts have pow-
erful discovery tools at their disposal. Professor
First's argument that these methods for fact de-
terminations are second to none is more contro-
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versial. Opponents of the civil jury trial in com-
plex cases would probably disagree with him,
and though I am not one of those opponents per-
sonally, they certainly exist. Similar circum-
stances exist even when the judge is the trier of
fact. Skeptics of the generalist judiciary model
that we have, including many from the Conti-
nental tradition, cannot understand how judges
who might see one antitrust case every couple of
years can cope, even if they are the triers of fact.
How do they know what all of this evidence
means? Well, I actually think our judges rise to
the occasion very well, but the key point here is
that our methods for determining facts may need
improvement and are not universally admired.
Last, it is quite clear that the U.S. offers a menu
of remedies.
Could a U.S.-style system of antitrust improve
market access to foreign countries? If the real
concern is to ensure that competition laws in
other countries are effectively enforced and that
foreign firms in particular who are seeking ac-
cess into those markets can be assured of com-
petitive conditions, you can do nothing better
than create a private right of action in those coun-
tries-break the government's monopoly on an-
titrust enforcement. Under those circumstances,
you would not have to worry about whether any
particular enforcement agency is likely to bring
an action. People would be able, as they can here,
to take matters into their own hands. This sug-
gests that at least the private action aspect of the
U.S. system could be genuinely useful.
Could we use a model of unilateral U.S. en-
forcement as a way of handling problems of the
international economy? Well, I certainly agree
that proposals to push everything into the WTO
(which is being pursued at a very serious level
by the European Union) are premature at best.
We will need to be very careful if we end up go-
ing down that line because there are so many
visions of what competition means around the
world. We would not want inadvertently to sign
on to one that was incompatible with our own
notion. On the procedural level, there are also
many problems that will stand in the way of try-
ing to use a unilateral U.S. approach.
In the international setting, there are serious
practical limitations on the unilateral model. I
have already mentioned that foreign countries
look at fact discovery, document discovery, and
use of witnesses quite differently from the way
we do. The theory of personal jurisdiction is also
crucial. If you are in a U.S. court, you are a party,
and the court has personal jurisdiction over you,
then one of the things that goes along with that
fact is that the court can order you to do things.
The court can say to you, "Bring your documents
into court." The court can say to you, "Show up
for a deposition." The court can say to you,
"Show up for a hearing." The court does not care
where you keep your documents. If you like
keeping them in London, you can just jolly well
go get them from London, as far as the U.S. court
is concerned. That is not the way the UK authori-
ties would look at it. They do not care whether
the U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over you
or not-because their view is that if those docu-
ments are physically located in London and the
only reason you decide that you are going to go
to retrieve them is because some foreign court
(worst of all, a U.S. court) told you to do it, that
is the same thing as the U.S. court setting up
chambers in London and starting to issue judi-
cial decrees, plainly an affront of UK sovereignty.
So the result of a Rule 34 request for documents
located in London, with perfect personal juris-
diction in the United States, could be a diplo-
matic incident. The UK says, no, you cannot get
the documents unless you go through our proce-
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dures our way, and, by the way, we mistrust a lot
of your enforcement anyway. I am happy to re-
port that the U.S. authorities are slowly making
progress in trying to show our foreign counter-
parts that there are times when these requests of
ours are legitimate. Even then, however, it is
important to go through the appropriate chan-
nels before cooperation will be forthcoming.
So right away, if the documents are not lo-
cated in the United States or if the witness is not
located in the United States or willing to come
to the United States, you have a huge problem
getting the documents or the person. Of course,
we know the other thing the U.S. court can do, if
the documents or witness is a party and it's a
proper Rule 34request, is you can try going down
the sanction route: get an order, have the person
fail to comply, get sanctions - and that works
sometimes. It also means, however, that you bet-
ter really hope that you do not need to do any-
thing to enforce your judgment in the other coun-
try because is not likely to happen. There could
even be a blocking decree. Thus, the informa-
tion problem is a very significant one.
Another problem comes up at the level of ba-
sic jurisdiction. Many of the examples that we
have talked about have been examples of inter-
national enforcement by the United States op-
posed by other countries on the ground that our
efforts have exceeded the scope permitted under
public international law. This is particularly true
in the export-oriented cases. Most people in other
countries these days accept the importance and
the legitimacy of enforcement in cases dealing
with imports into that country where products
are sold at prices that reflect monopolies or price-
fixing cartels, or the like, but the export cases
are a different matter. There was a firestorm when
Footnote 159 of the DOJ Antitrust Guidelines
for International Operations was removed from
the guidelines, notwithstanding the fact that it
had only been in there four years. By way of
background, there had been from 1890 through
1988 a policy which allowed some cases to be
brought against restrictions on export commerce;
even the Supreme Court reviewed a few. From
1988 until 1992, however, the Department of
Justice announced in Footnote 159 that it would
no longer bring cases dealing solely with export
restraints. When, in 1992, Footnote 159 was de-
leted and the former policy was reinstated, the
change was heavily criticized.
The most controversial cases are still the mar-
ket access export-oriented cases, and I am not at
all optimistic that this will be an attitude that
changes any time soon. We just have to be prac-
tical. These cases are not easy to bring, but it is a
theory that Congress recognizes and supports. It
is a road that the Department of Justice tries to
follow when it can. Private parties, in theory, can
do so also.
So what do we do instead? My suggestion is
not to be so pessimistic about bilateral coopera-
tion because bilateral cooperation really works.
We know that it works because we have tried it
in a number of instances where it was legally
possible to do it. It is a realistic response to the
fact that markets are international now. It is a
response that the SEC has used with great suc-
cess since about the mid-1980s. They went
through exactly the same pattern as the antitrust
enforcers have followed, trying to push every-
body around the world into giving them infor-
mation and running up against the same road-
blocks. The difference with the SEC is that in
1988, they obtained legislation allowing them to
enter into cooperative agreements with other
countries. They did so, and now they have about
18 of them. The entire atmosphere has changed.
The authorities all exchange documents. There
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is a significant flow of information-some 300
requests in each direction per year, and it has
helped tremendously in the efforts to enforce the
rules protecting securities markets.
Maybe one might say that there is more glo-
bal support for the securities rules than there is
for rules about global competition. If so, all the
more reason to take things one step at a time and
make sure that we are on the same general wave-
length with other countries before we start try-
ing to move forward at an international level.
With the Canadians, whose law is sufficiently
similar to ours, we have exactly that kind of
working relationship because we have a treaty,
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, that covers
criminal antitrust matters. We can exchange in-
formation lawfully with them under that treaty,
and several of the cases Professor First mentioned
were made possible because of that treaty. The
same thing is true in the Microsoft case (see gen-
erally, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318,
(D.C.Cir., 1995)), in which Microsoft decided
to waive its right to confidentiality in a limited
fashion in order to permit the authorities of the
European Commission and Department of Jus-
tice to work together and resolve the Microsoft
case all in one proceeding. Obviously, the right
was theirs to waive, and they chose to do so. I do
not expect waivers to be very important in cartel
cases, but this is another example of when
someone's law is close enough to ours that we
can work with them on that common ground. This
is the way, ultimately, that international enforce-
ment will move forward, and at the same time, it
will almost surely lead to a convergence of sub-
stantive policies and rules as we begin to see from
one another's experience what is really impor-
tant in this field.
I do not think this will come easily because I
think the United States has some reputational
problems to overcome based on our history of
unilateral action. We also should assure people
that we will not use our antitrust laws in overtly
political ways, but the record on antitrust is ex-
cellent on that. Other countries need to be con-
vinced that when we talk about market access,
we are not converting the antitrust laws into a
powerful adjunct to Section 301, which people
really, really do not like in other countries. We
also need to assure them somehow that with the
right mechanisms in place, the right kinds of
cooperative arrangements, the right commitment
to positive comity, we will refrain from objec-
tionable assertions of jurisdiction. We might be-
gin with a promise to resort first to the estab-
lished cooperation mechanism and see how well
that goes. We would not be giving up anything
irretrievably because if they refuse to take up the
ball, then we would be reserving the right to act
ourselves, but the first resort would address many
present difficulties.
We also need to make sure that everyone is
confident that sensitive busifness information
does not fall into the wrong hands. You would
be amazed how many people in other countries
are fearful that if the Department of Justice ob-
tains information from companies located in
other countries that the Department of Justice is
going to package it all up in FedEx boxes and
send it over to the private bar. As this audience
knows, that is not the way information gets
handled by the Department of Justice or the FTC.
The concerns of foreign companies and enforce-
ment authorities can be addressed through dia-
logue and through education. These are surely
problems that can be overcome. In my view, se-
rious bilateral cooperation is the inevitable, im-
portant, and necessary next step in international
cooperation. Thank you.
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Presentation by Mr. Rasher:
I am going to begin with just a little math-
ematical puzzle. I went to China in 1986 to open
up United's operations prior to our acquisition
of the Pacific Division of Pan Am. My business
colleague traveling with me had family in
Beijing; in fact, his grandmother still lived there.
I asked him for some pointers, and he told me
this little story.
He said, "imagine for a moment a single elimi-
nation tennis tournament with 32 players. He then
asked me, "how many matches do you have to
play to get to the winner?"
"Well," Chris said, "a westerner will tell you
that when you have 32 players, there will be 16
matches in the first round, 8 in the second, 4 in
the third, 2 in the fourth, then the final one. Your
answer is 31."
My business colleague told me how his Chi-
nese grandmother would answer. He said, "my
grandmother would say to me, well, if it's 32
players and a single elimination, you
have got 31 losers and 31 matches." Steven R
Now, the point of this story is that and Inte
people can view the same facts and responsi
have totally different perspectives of the 30 cc
what those facts mean, how you get instrume
there, and what is the appropriate from Pa,
result. The reason I share this with London!
you is not so much because I thought Mexico
this morning's panel discussion was United it
a very good example of the point, with Ma
but to illustrate the fact that although & Zavis.
I am a lawyer, I also view myself as gan and
a business person. I was actually Universi
asked to participate in today's panel
discussion more in my capacity as a business per-
son, albeit I am a lawyer, but still to bring a busi-
ness perspective, if you will, to the topic at hand.
I am not going to get into legal theories or re-
fer to cases. I will be the first one to admit that I
am not a regularly practicing antitrust lawyer. I
do provide counsel within our company on both
the domestic and the international front. Thus, I
am somewhat conversant, but I will not profess
expertise in this area. I will, therefore, represent
the business person's perspective and what this
means in the context of my business.
I hope that the little story I shared with you
will have some relevance as we go through the
comments I share today. Also, let me begin by
stating that the views I express are my own, not
those of United Airlines.
First, I wholeheartedly agree with the propo-
sition that free access is, and should be, the pre-
eminent objective of antitrust policy. I feel that
asher is Assistant General Counsel-Commercial
rnational of United Airlines, Inc. He is primarily
ble for all international legal matters that arise in
9untries in which United operates. Mr. Rasher was
tal in United's acquisition of the Pacific Division
n Am in 1986, Air Wisconsin in 1991, the Pan Am
European routes in 1991, and the Latin American!
division from Pan Am in 1992. Prior to joining
1982, Mr. Rasher was a trial lawyer for nine years
yer, Brown & Platt and then with Katten, Muchin
He earned his J.D. from the University of Michi-
his B.S. in Business Administration from Miami
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way because all of the other theories propounded
today, in my view, are the hoped-for-expected-
result of free access. Whether you call it effi-
cient, or allocation, or consumer benefits, if you
truly have open access to free markets, you have
open competition; then, hopefully, you are go-
ing to get the efficiencies. Competition, there-
fore, is going to force the efficiencies. You are
also going to have the consumer benefits because
of the improved service and hopefully, have it at
a very economical cost. And I am, of course, in
favor of that.
If I understand him correctly, Professor First
expresses a concern about our court's ability to
deal with the open access issue. I will just posit
a question on this issue. I wonder whether our
court's refusal to deal with the open access issue
does not come from our economic philosophy.
Our philosophy presumes open access even
though we may not always adhere to this phi-
losophy.
This is why we have enforcement. We seek
judicial buzz-words or tests, if you will, to help
us reach the second or third layer of the onion to
ensure that we, in fact, have the open access. It
may be that the domestic perspective of our court
system, understandably with one hundred years
experience of focusing on the domestic economy,
makes it ill-equipped at present to deal with the
international economy. Although I am not sure
that the rest of the world will necessarily accept
that premise-which I will address in a moment.
Open access, however, is an interesting proposi-
tion because open access only becomes an issue
if, in fact, you cannot get the product into the
market.
This restriction on access is an interesting phe-
nomena. There are still a number of products and
services that the U.S. generates which have very
few access problems because they are unique
products. I am not talking specifically about the
technological items we have today. I am not talk-
ing about Kodak's access problem to Japan al-
though the reason you had an access problem
there was because you had a local producer who
was trying to protect its market.
On the other hand, if you take Boeing with its
larger aircraft, except for some slight resistance
in the European Community ("the EC") because
of Airbus, Boeing does not really have that many
true access problems. They may have some mar-
keting problems and some pricing problems, but,
they do not really have that many true access
problems because they have a unique product.
We need to understand that when we are talk-
ing about open access, we are also talking about
a certain number of products where, over time,
the home country has developed its own infra-
structure in that particular field. There may be
some resistance in letting in that product. If a
country does not have the product and they need
it, they will import it.
Finally, on the free access issue, I want to talk
about something Professor Epstein said. We pro-
fess open access, yet, we speak out of both sides
of our mouth. Open access is a two-way street. I
thought Professor Epstein was quite eloquent in
providing some examples of where the United
States is not exactly on the right side of the smell
test. As the United States goes forward interna-
tionally in trying to influence the rest of the world
to adopt our perspective, the U.S. is going to have
to look more critically at ourself. The United
States is open to attack, and this fact will under-
mine our credibility, both in terms of trying to
influence and enforce.
As I am in the airline industry, I would like to
share some industry thoughts. Over the last few
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years, the United States' Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration has placed a number of Latin Ameri-
can countries on a "safety black list" because of
various safety violations of either their carriers
or their own regulatory authority in policing the
safety practices of their carriers. Given the num-
ber of accidents in the U.S. over the last couple
of years, this list has been somewhat of a politi-
cal hot potato. The black listed countries are now
coming back and saying, "now look, we have
had one accident and look at all the accidents
you have up there." We have to be very careful
about taking the high road, so to speak." We had
better understand our situation at home and make
sure that we can, in fact, go forward with clean
slates.
I would like to address my second topic some-
what more briefly. I know I am being a lawyer
and taking more time than I want, but it is the
political element both Professor First addressed
somewhat in his speech, and, I think, Judge Wood
got into a bit more in her presentation. In the
airline industry, we are very much in the politi-
cal realm because the airline industry, from an
international perspective, is still a regulated in-
dustry; although, we are trying to push it to less
of a regulatory environment and more of an
"open skies" environment.
It is no secret that open skies is one of United
Airline's agendas. We push this and will continue
to push. We were at the forefront in the push for
deregulation in 1978. We have been at the fore-
front of pushing for open skies agreements with
as many countries as we can. Nevertheless, this
is a political process, and I do not mean to sug-
gest with my following comments that antitrust
as a discipline is a political process.
We need to recognize that antitrust, given that
it so directly impacts upon our economic envi-
ronment, has to be construed as part of a politi-
cal process. Let me try to briefly put a little meat
on that one. We need to understand that not all
countries, for many reasons, will accept the prin-
ciple of open access to markets. This is a very
important point which needs to be addressed, and
a significant impediment if you think about it. It
goes back to my earlier premise that domesti-
cally we are over that hump and now are trying
to implement it.
We must recognize this political reality, and
Japan is a good example. Japan is not yet over
the hump. The political aspects of antitrust have
many implications. The most significant issue
for many countries is jobs, jobs, jobs. Jobs are
at the heart of the economy and at the heart of
the citizenship. I believe that fear of the loss of
jobs underlies the resistance to access in many
cases. One example: United has been very ac-
tive before the EC in certain proceedings brought
before DG4 to open up some of the ground han-
dling monopolies at Frankfort Airport and at the
airport in Milan. The EC initiated a separate pro-
cess to obtain a directive which would force the
liberation of the ground handling for all the pas-
senger service. They also moved to liberate the
monopolies which service airplanes in the hang-
ers and the cargo handler.
Four of the carriers involved were very recep-
tive to the case. The case was initially brought
by British Airways, Air France, and others, and
we joined them and we got to a certain point
where the initial draft of the directive was quite
acceptable in opening up access. We were all in
agreement that we wanted access. We assumed
it would create efficiencies, lower prices, and
improve the quality of service. Well, a directive
was proposed. The directive impacted labor. The
EC Labor Section became involved at the insis-
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tence of both the Italians and the Germans in
particular, as well as some of the others that had
monopolies, like the French and the Greeks. It
came down to jobs. They told us the directive
we obtained will cost us jobs. The revised direc-
tive that was ultimately issued was subject to
conditions but had a lot of holes in it. We are
probably not going to have much liberalization
beyond this for another 10 or 15 years.
The lesson is that we have to be pragmatic
when we go to open up markets internationally.
This is especially true because what we want will
affect jobs. These are the facts of life that we
have to deal with internationally when it comes
to access. Access is about politics. It is a fact of
life that many countries' economic politics are
very much politicized processes. It is part of their
political agenda, and it is well articulated and
well coordinated. Foreign countries have differ-
ent standards of operation, both in terms of gov-
ernment operation and the coordination of gov-
ernment with business.
Well, what does this suggest? As I said ear-
lier, it is quite apparent that not all cultures and
economies accept the U.S.'s approach to econom-
ics and business. We believe in the survival of
the fittest, open access, and then "let's see what
happens" approach. While that is our basic te-
net, that is not their basic tenet. In many coun-
tries, I submit that the U.S. is going to have dif-
ficulty in selling the open access principle and
getting true open access. The economic reality
within many countries is a need to preserve jobs.
The U.S. needs to recognize that political factor
in going forward with our antitrust policy; it is
so inextricably tied with economic policy.
Our judicial system is well-equipped, and I
think it is one of the best in the world to address
these types of issues, at least domestically. I have
concerns as to ability of the judiciary to do so
internationally for the reasons that Professor First
and Judge Wood articulated. The problem I have
with Professor First's proposition is a reliance
upon the judiciary as a prime force or a vehicle
to seek change in international markets, antitrust
change in international markets, and use of the
judiciary as a primary vehicle for international
antitrust enforcement. I believe we are talking
about a deep philosophical and infrastructure-
type of issue. I suggest we borrow a page from
the commercial world.
I was a litigator for ten years before I joined
United. I do not do any litigation now. I once
did a moderate amount of antitrust litigation. As
a trial lawyer my main objective was to win for
my client. This is not necessarily the
businessman's main objective. From the
businessman's perspective, usually winning the
lawsuit is not the objective. Rather, while this
may be a disappointment for many litigators, the
litigation process is also not the driving force.
From a commercial perspective, you have a busi-
ness issue, you have a commercial objective, and,
for better or for worse, sometimes you have to
employ litigation as a tactic to achieve that com-
mercial purpose.
Hopefully, if you have good, strong business
people and an in-house lawyer involved, one that
understands what the business objective is, in
many cases the litigation approach is a good tac-
tic because it brings pressure to bear. People get
to flex their muscles. They spend some money.
But, finally, they start truly looking at the facts
and start analyzing the risks and benefits and start
measuring them. The parties will ultimately come
to resolution. That is why so many cases are
settled rather than going to full trial. Therefore,
what happens, hopefully, is that the lawsuit then
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should be resolved, but that does not mean that
lawsuit has not served its purpose. In fact, it has
because it was very instrumental in getting to
where you want to go.
I am suggesting that, in addition to some of
the other suggestions that were made as to the
various vehicles, we ought to use antitrust en-
forcement devices to achieve our policies. One
for which some disdain was expressed earlier in
the day, but Professor Fox alluded to, is a posi-
tive thing, and the one thing we cannot overlook,
but see it as an important arrow in the quiver is
to use our antitrust policies. There may be an
antitrust policy articulated by the government; I
sense there is, but I am not sure about its coordi-
nation, and I am sure the Japanese have an ar-
ticulated competition policy.
Assuming our government has a policy, we
should then use the judiciary as a vehicle to bring
pressure to bear. I am suggesting that the judi-
ciary, whether private parties or the government,
should be seeking cases that will give you the
bigger bang for the buck-the case that will bring
pressure to get the parties to the table. I am not
convinced that individual case resolution will
change the infrastructure. I think it can bring
the parties to the table because a lot of barriers
we face are not so much the company itself-it
is really the government under which it is pro-
tected. Japan is a good example. This is my
basic proposition.
Do I know how we get there? I am not ex-
actly sure, but that is the basic proposition. I
can give you one example, and I will leave it at
that. In the airline industry, as part of the Air-
line Deregulation Act, there was a section
passed called IACTFA. Don't ask me what the
acronym is. I can never remember. Basically,
it allows carriers to bring an action in the De-
partment of Transportation to enforce against
not only a carrier of the particular country but
the country itself for violation of the aviation
bilaterals. Very few of those cases actually go
to trial. What it does is bring pressure to bear
and bring out some of the facts so that the cases
can then be resolved through negotiation on a
government-to-government basis. I am suggest-
ing that given the political realities we have to
face, if we are going to change perspectives on
market access, vehicles of that nature should
be continued, and if need be, improved.
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QUESTION & ANSWER
Q: I heard both Judge Wood and Professor
First refer to the court's apolitical approach to
antitrust. That might be a controversial statement,
especially overseas, because with the exception
of constitutional law, there is a no more heavily
politicized body of law than antitrust, or so an
argument could be made. But I think if you look
at the deeper political context, you quickly see
(especially with regard to Professor First's rec-
ommendation that Frances Jugamia and the other
nationalits) democracy is not competitive. It's
losing the competitive debate to social democ-
racy. And if you ask people why Eastern Europe,
they will say, I think, if we kick out the political
royalists, then we have no need to create eco-
nomic royalists such as they had in the United
States. I have heard this several times, but in
terms of a kind of ideological competition sys-
tem, to me-especially in Eastern Europe-the
Germans are making great headway, I suspect. I
suggest they're hoping to create "middle Europe"
before the Americans notice, but because of their
comparative advantage they apparently have not.
It is an entirely different mind set in which legal
economic oligopolies and Americans know little
and care less about.
Professor First: i just want to re-
spond to the beginning, when I said that non-
political elements-in the sense of non-protection-
ism-are in the sense of not favoring firms, be-
cause of their nationality. There are other aspects
of political choices that judges make, probably
even in antitrust cases, but I think that antitrust
generally in the U.S. is non-protectionism. I think
that is the sense in which I meant.
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